Real wage growth has slowed in the UK labour market and, since around 2003, median real wages have fallen. In this paper, we document the nature of real wage changes across the wage distribution over the last three decades, making it clear that the recent period of falling real wage growth represents a clear break of trend. We explore whether unemployment has again become a moderating influence on real wage growth, and document using aggregate economy-wide data and regional panel data that real wage-unemployment sensitivities have become stronger in the period from 2003 onwards.
Introduction
For the first time since the Great Depression, real wages in the UK are experiencing sustained falls in the absence of direct government wage controls. Even in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, real wage growth paused rather than going into reverse and a general picture of a steady real wage growth dominated the UK labour market through the 1980s and 1990s. Though wage inequality rose rapidly through those decades, through much faster growth in wages at the 90 th as compared to the 50 th percentile, and in turn faster growth at the 50 th compared to the 10 th percentile, this was (mostly) in the form of differential positive trends in real wage growth rather than through periods of real wage falls in any particular part of the distribution. This paper offers a first exploratory look at these patterns. We begin by documenting the nature of the real wage slowdown and then move on to ask whether the wage restraining effects of unemployment have played a role. A key aspect in studying this is to consider whether, and how 1 See Machin (2011) for detail on trends in wage inequality in the UK over the last forty years.
far, a tightening labour market (working through higher employment or lower unemployment) could in due course have scope to produce higher living standards. It also arises from a desire to understand the role played by unemployment in the surprising stability of employment combined with falling real wages that have been key features of the recent performance of the labour market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss labour market performance in the UK. In Section 3, we consider possible connections between real wages and unemployment. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 shows tests of the break from trends of positive real wage growth to the period of flat or falling real wage growth. Section 6 explores empirical real wage-unemployment sensitivities and presents empirical estimates studying whether there is evidence of variations through time. Section 7 concludes.
Labour Market Performance
The UK has a long history where around three quarters of the working age population have been in employment when the economy is at cyclical peaks. This was true in the late 1960s, most of the 1970s, briefly in the late 1980s and for a sustained period from the late 1990s to the onset of the most recent recession. This aggregate feature of the UK labour market is shown by the black (middle) line in Figure 2 , which shows the aggregate employment rate for all working age individuals between 1971 and 2010.
However, this aggregate pattern hides the huge shift in employment from men to women that has occurred. This is also shown in Figure 2 where, in the 1970s, around 90 percent of men were in work as compared to around 60 percent of women. By the late 1980s, this 30 percentage point difference had shrunk to 15 percentage points (with employment rates in the low 80 percents for men and high 60 percents for women). By 2000, it shrunk further still to just a ten percentage point difference (with 80 percent of men and 70 percent of women in work). There are compositional changes within these big shifts, such that, in the 1980s, the fall in male employment was focused on older and less educated men and the growth for women was among better educated mothers with younger children. So where have the employment increases come from? The big increase in employment has been amongst the over 50s where cohorts of people who in earlier times would have retired early or gone onto disability benefits are now staying economically active, increasingly even beyond the state retirement age. We are also seeing moves to delayed entry into work through continued education via higher numbers of full-time students, and delayed exit relative to the 1980s and 1990s. 2 Therefore, since the end of the last recession in 1993, the employment rate of those aged 50 to 64 has risen by 10 percentage points (somewhat more for women than men) to 65 percent. On the other hand, for 16-17 year olds the employment rate has fallen from 40 to 20 percent and for 18-24 year olds from 64 to 57 percent. These trends are very much likely to continue especially extending working lives toward the age of 70, in part from recent pension system changes.
The initial picture of a constant 75 percent of adults being in work also masks the fact that population has grown rapidly so that maintaining constancy requires a huge increase in employment. In 1979 75 percent of adults in work translated into about 25 million workers. Prior to the onset of the current recession, the comparable number was 31 million workers.
The UK labour market has therefore shown a powerful capability to increase employment to match increases in population driven by both domestically and by migration. On the former, births have been a little above the replacement rate, which was most marked in the 1960s baby boom. On the latter, net international migration has also played a significant part. We can measure immigrant status by not being a British citizen or by being born outside the UK. On either benchmark, migrants have lower employment rates than the domestic population by around 6 percentage points.
Through the recession, the share of UK born people in work has fallen 2.2 percentage points, whilst the comparable number for the non-UK born is a fall of 2.9 percentage points. Thus, all groups have Since then these two groups have seen larger than average falls in employment, whilst the other groups mentioned above have fared better than for the population as a whole.
Raising employment among the least educated and deprived parts of Britain was not substantively achieved during the strong performance of the 2000s and many other groups, the disabled, lone parents, ethnic minorities and older and younger workers still show large amounts of economic inactivity which has the potential to be addressed. The reforms to pension systems that are extending the normal expected retirement age, penalize early retirement more and shifts to define contribution rather than defined benefit schemes are likely to see major increases in economic activity among those in their 60s over the next decade. Also the government is looking to get around 1 million disabled benefit claimants back into work, either through classifying them as being job ready and on Job Seekers Allowance or in the new Work Related Activity Group in ESA, and continue efforts to increase employment among parents to tackle child poverty. The expectation is thus then the potential increase in employment that Britain over the next decade could easily be above 5 million -1 openly unemployed above previous norms, 2 million over 60s, 1 million disabled and others and 1 million to absorb likely population growth currently running at 100,000
per year. Furthermore, with a rapidly ageing population the UK needs this employment to fund demands on pension system, health and social care services, where a sizable increase in employment will also be needed.
Real Wages and Unemployment
The recognition that unemployment can act to restrain wages dates back to the classical economists, (for example, Marx's discussion of the reserve army of labour). In modern economics, the Phillips Curve (Phillips, 1958 ) suggested a stable relationship existed between unemployment levels and wage growth, with higher unemployment restraining nominal wage changes. This empirical relationship lacked any theoretical foundations except the plausible principle that 'when demand for labour is high and there are very few unemployed we should expect employers to bid wage rates up quite rapidly..'. This relationship broke down in the period of high inflation in the 1970s and the theoretical and empirical evidence suggested that unemployment regulates the rate of real wage growth, the mark up of wage growth over inflation, rather than nominal wage changes, which meant that low unemployment was associated with not just higher wage growth but a situation where wage growth exceeded productivity and leads to a slow wage-price spiral. The level of unemployment that holds wage growth and inflation steady was called the Non-accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991) or the sustainable rate of unemployment by politicians. More recently, this debate has been revisited with Gali (2011) suggesting that the Phillips Curve has re-emerged in the US at least and suggesting that with wage setting rigidities the Phillips Curve relationship does have plausible theoretical underpinning.
Other empirical work has studied the relationship between the level of wages and local unemployment, via the existence of the so-called 'wage curve' (see Oswald, 1994, 1995 ; and the meta-study of Nijkamp and Poot, 2005) . Sargan (1964) noted that the steady state (long run) solution to the Phillips' curve specifies that the level of wages depends on the level of unemployment. Moreover, in US work, Hines, Hoynes and Krueger (2001) argue that a relationship between the levels of unemployment and (real) wages both fits the data better and has a better justified theoretical justification to show how unemployment can restrain wages.
In Britain we have been used to steadily rising wages, outside periods of recession, that have increased broadly in line with the productivity growth of the economy. In periods of recession output falls, but employment has tended to fall to a similar or slightly greater degree, leaving productivity broadly stable and then real (adjusted for inflation) wages broadly stable. Therefore, after a recession, higher unemployment restrains wages and economic growth is jobs rich, but real wages do not fall to any significant degree. In low unemployment periods, growth feeds into wages to a greater degree than employment. Hence in the UK, as in other developed countries, the cyclical volatility of unemployment is large relative to that of real wages that has long puzzled economists (see Pissarides, 2009 and Kudlyak, 2010 , for recent overviews).
The last decade has seen something radically different to these patterns. First, by historical standards Britain has been experiencing not just a severe recession but what some commentators want to refer to as a second Great Depression. Indeed, the fall in economic output in the recent recession was almost as large as the 1930s, but the recovery has been markedly slower. Figure 4 shows that output still lies some 4% below peak levels four years on from the start of the recession, long after the 1930s was in a sustained economic recovery.
One possible reason why things may not feel like a Depression to some is that the loss of employment has been very modest. Figure 5 shows that just over 2 percent of jobs have been lost in the current recession compared to 6% in the previous two recessions. Indeed, a jobs recovery starting as soon as the economy showed some growth in late 2009 and again has held up well in the long period of economic stagnation that start in the second half of 2010. This means that productivity growth has stalled since the middle of 2006, which in historical terms is a remarkably sustained period.
Whilst the employment record has been good, the picture for wages has not. There have been sustained real wage falls, on a scale not seen since WWII, outside the period of government imposed wage controls in the 1970s. This has not just been associated with surge in inflation in 2011, as both before the inflation push and as inflation has started to moderate over the last 6 months, real wage growth has been in negative territory. The last data shows average weekly earnings rising by 1.4% which inflation as measured by the CPI is at 3%. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1 real wage growth stalled in the UK from somewhere around 2003, well before the onset of the recession, and even though productivity growth still rose by over 6%. Therefore, the UK has had a sustained period of flat or falling real wages, but employment levels have been sustained remarkably well through the recession.
Higher unemployment restrains wages in three potential ways. First, in times of high unemployment workers have a reduced scope to push for higher wages because of alternative offers from another firm. Secondly, because workers fear job loss more when there are so many more people to compete against to get a replacement job, they may cede wages to hold on to a job.
Finally, new job openings are flooded with applicants and firms can secure well qualified labour at lower wages than in better times.
Evidence suggests, however, that the unemployed and employed workers are not close competitors. Workers losing their jobs tend to return to work at substantially lower wages (Nickell, Quintini and Jones, 2002) , especially for longer periods of unemployment, and part of these wage loses persist for very long periods. Those suffering from longer periods of unemployment also struggle to maintain stable employment, suffering further periods of unemployment even 15 or more years later (Gregg, 2001) . Part of the permanent loss of earnings stems from this instability of later employment or repeat job loss (Gregg and Tominey, 2005) . This all suggests that many unemployed struggle on the margins of the labour market rather than acting as close substitutes those in stable work. The more concentrated unemployment is on individuals (long-term unemployment), regions or skill groups is likely to reduce this competition effect and reduce the downward pressure on wages and hence the sensitivity of wages for workers already in employment has regular been found to be low.
The recent evidence of slower real wage growth does not necessarily mean that wage setting has become more sensitive to unemployment. The pay restraints imposed by government in the 1970s are widely thought to have led to a build of wage pressure that was released after 1979, just as unemployment was rising and the trade union influence was in decline, which is again widely thought to have led to reduced wage pressure, especially among low wage workers. Hence, this period saw quite rapid wage growth among middle to high earners and thus rising wage inequality (Machin, 1996 (Machin, , 2011 . Possibly more pertinent to this period is the large scale migration from A8 countries from 2004, which could place extra downward pressure on wages. Note that such migration would be focused on areas of high job demand and hence low unemployment. So this would tend to dampen the sensitivity of wages to local variations in unemployment as labour is arriving into these areas from overseas. So wage pressure in an economy may increase or decrease without any particular sensitivity to unemployment levels or indeed may involve reduced sensitivity to local unemployment conditions. Thus, it is hard to assess whether this period of constrained wage growth since 2003 reflects an increased sensitivity to unemployment from looking at aggregate data. It may simply reflect an aggregate slowdown in wage pressure for reasons unconnected to prevailing levels of unemployment. So to explore this question of wages have become more sensitive to unemployment, we look both at the macroeconomic picture but we have also developed a data set for the UK regions over time, including wages for low, medium, and higher paid workers separately, together with regional (un-)employment.
We wish to assess the sensitivity of wages to local unemployment to study whether this relationship appears to have strengthened and therefore resulted benign real wage growth and increased the importance of low unemployment for delivering real wage growth. If this is the case, we also wish to consider where in the wage distribution any such process seems has occurred.
Data
We use employer reported wages data from the New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (NES/ASHE). For most of our analysis, we consider weekly wages (in 2011 prices,
deflating by the retail price index) at different decile points of the wage distribution. Our initial analysis considers log real wages at the median of the distribution, but we also study log real wages at different decile points. The unemployment rate is the ILO unemployment rate by region which we constructed from the Labour Force Survey.
We have put together a panel of data on wages from the NES/ASHE data and unemployment rates from the Labour Force Survey for the standard regions of Britain: North East; North West; Yorkshire and Humberside; East Midlands; West Midlands; East Anglia; London; South East; South West; Wales; and Scotland. The sample we use covers these eleven regions for the years 1986 through 2010.
Trends in Real Wages
Figure 1 is highly suggestive that a temporal break in real wage growth across the wage distribution occurred in the early 2000s. Indeed, as is shown in the left hand charts of Figure 6 , if a linear trend is fit to the real wage growth trends over the full time period 1979-2010, it under-predicts up to 2003 and over-predicts afterwards. This is the case for the 10 th , 50 th and 90 th percentiles of the wage distribution, but is probably more marked for the 10 th percentile.
If, however, a linear trend is fit to the real wage growth data only in the period up to 2003, as shown in the right hand charts of Figure 6 , it fits the data much better (certainly in terms of the start and end points). This tends to suggest that real wage growth trended up positively, at a faster rate higher up the wage distribution thus raising wage inequality, up to 2003. After this, the labour market moves to a different pattern of real wage growth, where it has recently turned negative. The figure also suggests far greater cyclical amplitude of real wages among lower wage workers.
This pattern of growing wage inequality and a recent slowdown in wage growth is also shown in Table 1 where the greater magnitudes of the trends in the real wage growth distribution higher up the distribution can be seen. 
Estimates of Changing Real Wage-Unemployment Sensitivities
This section reports some first results from estimating real wage-unemployment sensitivities from economy-wide and regional real wage equations between 1986 and 2010. Table 2 shows real wage-unemployment sensitivities estimated from an equation relating the log of the median real wage to the log unemployment rate and a linear trend (and a split trend in column (2) 
Economy Wide Median Real Wage Equations

Economy Wide Real Wage Equations Across the Distribution
The model in Table 2 was estimated for median real wages. We have also estimated real wage-unemployment sensitivities and real wage trend differences at different decile points. The results are reported in Table 3 . With the exception of the 10 th percentile (which was affected by the introduction of the minimum wage after its introduction in 1999), we see a stronger impact of unemployment on real wages in the 2003-2010 period of benign real wage growth. Thus it does seem, at least at first glance from the macroeconomic time series estimates, that in the period when real wages ceased their trend growth, they have become more sensitive to unemployment. Table 4 reports the first set of estimates showing estimated elasticities of the regional median real weekly wage with respect to the regional unemployment rate from the previous year.
Regional Median Real Wage Equations
The wage equations include regional fixed effects and so the estimated elasticities can be interpreted in terms of changes. The specifications include a full set of year effects. Interestingly, in terms of changes through time, we see the same pattern of results as for the economy wide analysis.
The estimated regional real wage-unemployment sensitivities show no significant relationship in the 1986-2002 time period, but a significant negative relationship (i.e. an elasticity of -0.049) in the 2003-10 time period. Thus, real wages became more sensitive to unemployment at the regional level in this latter period. The change of -0.059, with an associated standard error of 0.015, is strongly significant in statistical terms and is close in magnitude to the change of -0.045 in the aggregate median real wage specification reported in Table 2 . Overall, the regional results are suggestive of a general slowdown in real wage growth combined with growing sensitivity to local conditions. Table 5 explores the robustness of the regional median real wage findings. Panel A uses fulltime weekly earnings, Panel B considers hourly earnings and Panel C looks at the regional employment-population ratio rather than the regional unemployment rate. The estimates reported are comparable to the Table 4 models that include a full set of year effects. The results in the three Panels of the Table confirm and strongly corroborate the Table 4 findings. The 2003-10 time period of benign real wage growth is one where unemployment/employment is more strongly correlated with median real wages than the period of positive real wage growth that preceded it.
Regional Real Wage Equations Across the Distribution
The final empirical exercise we consider looks at different percentiles of the wage distribution in the regional panel. Estimates of decile specific real wage-unemployment elasticities for 1986-2002 and 2003-10 are reported in Table 6 , along with the change in these elasticities across the two sub-periods. At almost all deciles -the 10 th percentile being the exception -the real wage-unemployment elasticities became larger (in absolute magnitude) in the second time period.
The different behavior at the 10 th percentile is most likely because the minimum wage propped up wages in the 2000s after its introduction in 1999. In the regional context, this will be likely to have boosted wages most in low wage and mostly high unemployment areas, thus lowering the relationship between wages and local unemployment. However, for the rest of the distribution, one sees unemployment restraining real wages by more in the 2003-10 time period.
Conclusions
In this exploratory paper, we study the fact that real wage growth has stagnated in the UK from around 2003 and ask whether this can be related to a return of unemployment holding back real wages that was either not present or less marked in the period of real wage growth that came before.
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